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Introduction
Investment platforms, also known as 'fund supermarkets', are important intermediaries in mutual fund investment. These web-based services allow retail investors to research, buy and sell, manage, and monitor their holdings in mutual funds. The U.K. mutual fund industry, which is the focus of this paper, is one of the largest outside the U.S., with some GBP1.2 trillion of assets under management. 1 Investment platforms have been growing rapidly: assets under administration (AUA) increased from GBP108 billion in 2008 to GBP592 billion in 2016, and platforms now channel over 50% of U.K. mutual fund flows. Investment platforms offer investors a wide array of mutual funds to choose from, and like other intermediaries, many platforms provide lists of 'best buys' or 'top picks' for their investors, which we refer to as 'recommendations'. Given the growing importance of platforms and the fact that their recommendations are made available directly to the general public, they have become increasingly a focus of attention in the U.K. This is particularly because, in two ways, platforms are exposed to potential conflicts of interest which may lead to favoritism when making recommendations. First, some leading platforms are affiliated with mutual funds, that is, they run a fund supermarket and offer mutual funds which they manage -their 'own brands' -through that supermarket. Second, until a regulatory change which was fully implemented in 2016, platforms in the U.K. could receive from mutual funds a share of the commission revenue on investments which were channeled through the platform.
As part of a review of the asset management industry by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (the 'FCA'), we have access to detailed, non-public data for three leading direct-toconsumer platforms over the period 2006-2015 including access to platforms' recommendations of mutual funds. 2 Each of these platforms covers on average 45% by number, and 75% by value, of all mutual funds available to retail investors in the U.K. Together these three platforms have a 1 As estimated by the Investment Company Institute (2017).
2 The FCA initiated a Wholesale Sector Competition Review in July 2014. It was conducted in two parts, with an initial review of Wholesale and Investment Banking, followed by a review of Asset Management (which was launched in November 2015).
2 share of over 50% of assets under administration of all U.K. platforms. As well as platforms'
recommendations across a wide range of asset classes and investment regions, our data set includes precise details of the fees charged by asset managers, the fraction of these fees shared with platforms and, for two of the platforms, the investor flows into mutual funds which were channeled through the platforms. This allows us to link recommendations with incentives, flows, and performance in a way which has not been possible in previous studies of mutual fund intermediation.
We use this unique data set to address three main questions. First, what drives platform recommendations? Second, what effect do these recommendations have on mutual fund flows?
And, third, do these recommendations add value for investors? In answering all these questions we also assess the effect on drivers, flows, and performance of the two potential sources of conflicts of interest mentioned above, namely affiliation and revenue-sharing. Our main results are as follows.
Looking first at the drivers of recommendations, we find that affiliated funds are more likely to be recommended by platforms. Controlling for past performance, Morningstar analyst ratings, costs, and other variables, affiliated funds are significantly more likely to be added to the recommendation list than non-affiliated funds. Average model-implied addition probabilities for affiliated funds are three times as large as for otherwise identical non-affiliated funds. At the same time, other things equal, affiliated funds are less likely to be deleted from recommendation lists than non-affiliated funds. We estimate that these differences in addition and deletion probabilities imply a long term equilibrium percentage of non-affiliated funds in recommendation lists equal to 3.6%, compared to 13.8% for otherwise identical affiliated funds. Thus, the longterm percentage of recommended affiliated funds is 3.8 times larger than the percentage of recommended non-affiliated funds. The tendency to recommend affiliated funds seems to have increased since regulatory changes were introduced that prohibit commission-sharing with funds.
We also find that recommended funds share a higher proportion of their revenues with the platforms than non-recommended funds. Our estimates indicate that, all else equal, an increase in platform revenues received from the fund of 25bps (the interquartile range) would result in an increase in the long-term percentage of funds in recommendation lists from 3.87% for funds with existing revenue share agreements to 5.18%, for otherwise identical funds with revenue share agreements 25bps higher.
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It is conceivable that platforms favor affiliated and high revenue-sharing funds in their recommendations because of some characteristic which is unobservable to the econometrician.
As a further test for this, we investigate whether funds affiliated with a platform and those sharing high levels of revenues with platforms are also favored in recommendations by
Morningstar Analysts who, like platforms, are making forward-looking recommendations (but do not face the same conflicting incentives as platforms), and we find that they are not.
Apart from affiliation and revenue sharing, we find that, on average, recommended funds had exhibited significantly better past performance than the non-recommended funds on the same platform. The percentage of funds rated as gold, silver, or bronze by Morningstar analysts, a forward looking third-party measure of quality, is also significantly larger among recommended than non-recommended funds. Recommended funds tend to have a lower expense ratio, making them less costly to investors in fee terms -a non-trivial characteristic in light of the evidence that investors have trouble minimizing fees when left to their own devices (see, for instance, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) , Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) , Anagol and Kim (2012) , or Grinblatt, Ikäheimo, Keloharju, and Knüpfer (2015) ).
Turning to the impact of recommendations on flows, our analysis shows that platform recommendations have a substantial impact on flows. Every year following the addition of a fund to a platform's recommendation list and while still recommended, that fund experiences an average inflow of GBP5.9 million, equating to 1% of the total assets under management of the fund (and not just those invested through the platform). When we interact recommendations with the first of our two possible conflict measures -affiliation -we find that GBP flows are less responsive to the recommendation of a fund affiliated with a platform. This may indicate that investors discount, to some extent, the own-brand recommendations of platforms. We find no significant effect, however, in the case of percentage flows. On the other hand, the response of flows to recommendations does not vary significantly with revenue-sharing, a characteristic that is not directly observable to investors, suggesting that investors do not offset platforms' biases along this dimension. The different responses of flows to affiliated and high revenue-sharing funds likely reflect the fact that fund affiliation is evident to investors whereas, in the U.K., revenue-sharing agreements are not disclosed.
As for our third question, whether recommendations add value for investors, we measure the performance of funds recommended by platforms on two bases: first assuming that funds are held only for the period during which they are recommended and second, to allow for less 4 responsiveness by investors, assuming that investors hold the recommended funds for five years starting from the first recommendation date (or until the end of our sample period). On the first of the two approaches, over our 10-year sample period, a portfolio comprising all funds recommended by platforms delivered average net returns in excess of Morningstar category benchmarks of 0.08% per year. In contrast, non-recommended funds available on the same platform under-perform the benchmarks by 0.86% per year. This makes the returns of recommended funds a statistically significant 0.94% per annum higher than the excess returns obtained by non-recommended funds available via the same platform. When we compare the returns of recommended funds to a matched sample of non-recommended funds classified in the same Morningstar asset category, which is a closer comparison, the results are similar:
recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds by a statistically significant 0.60% per year. We also find that the level of revenue sharing has little impact on these patterns:
recommended funds with both high and low revenue-sharing outperform non-recommended funds, although not always significantly. When we measure the performance of recommended funds on our second measure, which assumes a five-year holding period, we find qualitatively similar results.
However, these performance differences do not hold for the affiliated recommended funds, which perform no better than other available funds in the same Morningstar category (and available via the same platform). This is consistent with platforms being guided by favoritism, rather than private information, when adding own-brand funds to their best-buy lists.
Our paper is related to a growing literature that investigates the effect of financial intermediaries' incentives on their customers' portfolios. In this sense, the closest study to ours is Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto (2013) , which finds that mutual fund flows reflect the incentives (notably revenue sharing) of the brokers that intermediate them. Given our access to recommendations issued by the intermediaries (platforms), we build on this finding by disentangling intermediary actions from customer actions and by providing more direct evidence of the role of platforms and their recommendations in directing flows, as well as of the quality of the recommendations provided. This allows us, for instance, to explore explicitly the role of platforms in recommending affiliated funds and funds that pay them a higher share of revenues, rather than merely establishing which funds are more likely to be available via platforms. It also allows us to investigate whether investors see through and undo the biases faced by recommending platforms. The focus on favoritism toward affiliated funds is something our paper 5 shares with Pool, Sialm, and Stefanescu (2016) who, in a different context, investigate whether mutual fund families acting as trustees of 401(k) plans display favoritism toward their own funds.
Our paper is also closely linked to the work of Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) who study broker-sold and direct-sold mutual funds, and fail to find that brokers deliver substantial tangible benefits, a conclusion also supported by the work of Chalmers and Reuter (2012) and Del Guercio and Reuter (2014) . Bergstresser, Chalmers and Tufano (2009) argue that this is consistent with two hypotheses: that brokers deliver substantial intangible benefits that they do not observe, and that there are material conflicts of interest between brokers and their clients. Our study differs from theirs in that, by having access to intermediaries' recommendations, we can make a closer connection between advice and performance, without the confounding effect of customer actions. Moreover, since we study the direct-to-customer business of investment platforms, we can be comfortable that one of the explanations in Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2009) does not apply to our setting, as there are no obvious intangible benefits from having access to recommendations.
More widely, the paper can be seen in the context of studies that explore the distortive incentives faced by agents, brokers, financial advisors and other intermediaries (see, e.g., Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012); Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2017) , Egan (2017) , and the theoretical work of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a , 2012b , and 2012c ). Unlike these papers we focus on a situation in which advice (in the form of recommendations) is given to a broad audience, rather than a particular customer, and we place strong emphasis on the performance associated with that advice.
Finally, two prior studies have looked at recommendations of managed products or mutual funds (not to mention the extensive literature on stock recommendations). Jenkinson, Jones, and Martinez (2016) look at recommendations made by investment consultants to
institutional clients but do not analyze conflicts of interest. Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek (2016) investigate Morningstar analyst ratings. By contrast, we study recommendations issued by multiple investment platforms over a significantly longer period of time (using Morningstar ratings as controls), and we relate them to the incentives those platforms face.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the institutional setting and our unique dataset. Section 3 analyses the determinants of recommendations and their effect on fund flows. In section 4 we compare the performance of funds that appear on best-buy 6 lists to those that do not, and how this performance differs for affiliated funds. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional setting and data
A. The role of investment platforms
Investment platforms are web-based services which allow retail investors to research, buy and sell, manage, and monitor their holdings in mutual funds. 3 They are an important and growing distribution channel in many countries. In the U.K., assets under administration held in platforms rose from around GBP100 billion at the end of 2008 to almost GBP600 billion at the end of 2016 (Platforum (2017) Figure 10 ). Platforms accounted for 52% of gross sales of funds to retail investors in 2015, representing GBP83 billion (Investment Association (2016)); a third of these platform sales were direct-to-consumer, and two-thirds were intermediated by an advisor (FCA (2016) ). In this paper, where we analyze the determinants and impact of platform recommendations, we focus on the direct-to-consumer channel. Sales not involving platforms may be made directly with an asset manager or through an advisor. 4 The leading direct-toconsumer platform in the U.K. is Hargreaves Lansdown, which has a 36% share of assets under administration. The next three largest -Barclays Stockbrokers, TD Direct Investing, and Fidelity
Personal Investing -have around 10% each. The rest of the market is shared among a large number of small players. Of the ten largest U.K. direct-to-consumer platforms by market share, seven are vertically integrated, meaning that they have affiliated mutual funds which they offer via their platform (FCA (2016) ). 3 We use 'investment platform' synonymously with 'fund supermarket'. The term 'investment platform' is sometimes used in the U.K. to include so-called 'wrap' platforms, in which assets other than fund shares (e.g. directly owned equities) may be held, but we do not include these in our definition.
4 Data for the U.S. market do not allow a straight comparison. Recent Investment Company Industry research (ICI, (2016) ) shows that 34% of U.S. mutual fund-owning households bought at least some of their mutual fund shares via a category of channels which includes fund supermarkets, discount brokers, and asset management companies directly, the other channels being employer-sponsored retirement plans and investment professionals (brokers, etc.).
A number of U.S. firms which are not primarily platform providers nonetheless offer such a service. For example, Charles Schwab, known primarily as a bank and broker, also provides an investment platform comparable with those in our data set.
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Investment platforms offer a wide range of funds, which can be classified and ranked by the user according to, among other criteria, asset class, investment style, charges, as well as thirdparty rankings, notably those of Morningstar. 5 Within its universe of funds, a platform may also provide a list of recommended funds which is updated from time to time. Selection criteria include past performance, perceived risk, charges, process, tenure of the fund manager, as well as third-party rankings. These platform recommendations are the focus of the present paper.
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The way in which platforms are remunerated for their services must be seen in the context of a regulatory change which occurred in the U.K. towards the end of our sample period. From 2006, when our sample starts, to 2012, investors paid a single all-in annual fee (and in some cases an initial charge) to the asset manager, who could share this fee with platforms in return for channeling funds to them. The details of such revenue-sharing arrangements were not disclosed and even their existence was unknown to many investors. 7 There were no separate payments to platforms. In particular, there were no 'sales loads' as are commonly paid to intermediaries in the U.S. The value of revenues paid to platforms by mutual funds as part of the revenue-sharing arrangements were typically between 0.5% and 0.75% of the amount invested. 7 The initial charges were typically at levels substantially lower than the maximum level stated in a fund's prospectus.
The number of funds levying an initial charge had been declining over time as part of an industry trend towards a zero load environment in the U.K., and by 2012 only a small number of funds levied an initial charge. April 2016 all their clients were being charged a separate distribution (platform) fee. When revenue sharing was allowed in the U.K., there were two notable differences between institutional arrangements in the U.K. and the U.S. First, the amount of the annual (and sometimes) initial fees that funds shared with platforms was not disclosed in the U.K., whereas U.S. funds must disclose their 12b-1 fees, which represent the annual fees and initial charges which fund managers use for marketing and distribution expenses (although the breakdown between revenue sharing and other distribution/marketing costs is not disclosed). Second, there were no sales loads paid directly to U.K. platforms, in contrast to the U.S. mutual fund industry, where front-end loads in particular are an important part of the compensation of intermediaries.
Following the implementation of RDR, the situation in the U.K. is simple for platforms:
investors pay one fee to the platform (the platform charge) and a separate fee to the fund manager (the asset manager fee), and there is no sharing of either annual or initial charges.
B. The dataset
The FCA obtained data from the four largest investment platforms. One of these platforms was excluded from the analysis, as critical data required for our analysis (such as revenue share data and investment flow data) were not available. The analysis in this paper is therefore based on the remaining three large, well-established platforms. These platforms have a combined share in excess of 50% of the U.K. market for direct-to-consumer assets under administration. None of the smaller platforms, from which data was not obtained, has a market share in excess of 5%. Furthermore, most of them do not produce their own recommendations.
Data was provided on a monthly basis by each platform for the period 2006-2015, or the period during which a recommendation list was available to clients. commodities, property, money market, convertible and miscellaneous, because none (or almost none) of the funds in these categories ever appeared in the platform recommendation lists in our sample. The excluded categories only represent a small percentage of the funds offered by these platforms. Our dataset contains both currently operating and closed/merged funds.
For our analysis it is important to determine which funds are offered on each platform, as these funds form the pool from which a platform's recommendation lists are drawn. We use two criteria to infer availability in a platform: the existence of revenue share agreements (we only have this information on an end-of-year basis); and within-platform fund flows (this information was obtained by the FCA for two platforms and is available on a monthly basis but only when funds experience flows). We consider a fund as being available on a platform in any given month if there is a revenue share agreement in place and/or if, within three months of the month in question, there are flows within the platform. We find that both indicators coincide in almost all cases.
10 An exception to this rule is some mutual funds that were only available in clean share format before RDR. Those mutual funds are included in the pre-RDR analysis. 11 In our analysis the only use we make of share class information is to construct aggregate, fund-level, observations.
For each platform we use only the share classes distributed through that platform rather than all available fund share classes. This means that a mutual fund may have a different cost, revenue share agreement, and performance (past and future) when acquired through different platforms.
Of the funds listed on the platforms in our sample, some are affiliated to the platform and others are not affiliated. We use two different Morningstar Direct data fields ('branding name'
and 'advisor') to track affiliation from a fund to the platform. Branding name reflects the fund distributor, and advisor is the fund management company. A fund is considered affiliated to a platform if it shares branding name or advisor with the Platform.
Platforms typically carry a large number of mutual funds. As Table I shows, on average each platform in our sample includes 1,595 different mutual funds. This represents 45.2% of the funds available in the U.K. each year during our sample period (in the four large categories we study). The assets under management of these funds are 74.9% of all assets under management by U.K. mutual funds, suggesting that most of the larger funds are available via the platforms.
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During our sample period, on average of 7.2% of the funds available in the platforms appeared on internally prepared recommendation lists, a percentage that has shown a tendency to decrease over time.
As shown in Table II , funds offered on the platforms in our sample tend to be larger, older, and exhibit better past performance (prior one-and three-year performance and percentage of Morningstar 5 Star rated funds) and expected future performance (percentage of Morningstar gold and gold, silver or bronze rated funds) than those not available on the platforms.
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For the purposes of this table, performance percentiles are calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category and assuming no platform rebates, and average platform charges after RDR. Returns and fees and charges are also not platform-specific, and include an average platform service charge fee for clean share classes post-RDR. We also ignore initial charges, if any. This is in contrast to the rest of our analysis, where we concentrate on within platform comparisons. There, in calculating charges and the returns to 12 investors we take into account all charges and rebates offered by platforms. We do this by assuming investors hold a portfolio of GBP50,000 on a platform in order to calculate platform charges, which typically vary by portfolio size. When there are initial charges we also take their impact on costs and returns into account by assuming a five-year holding period.
The Morningstar Analyst rating reported in Table II is a qualitative, forward-looking measure of performance that reflects an analyst's expectation of a fund's future performance relative to its peers over a business cycle (see Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek (2016) for more information). The current Morningstar Analyst rating scale was introduced in November 2011
and consists of gold, silver, bronze, neutral and negative ratings. Before this, two different systems were used: elite, superior, standard, inferior, impaired, and an AAA, AA, A system inherited from the acquired business Old Broad Street Research. These were mapped together as follows (thus extending our sample back until 2006): elite and AAA historical ratings mapped directly to the gold ratings cohort, and we labeled them together as "gold". We also create a broader category capturing any level of positive recommendation, which we refer to as "gold, silver or bronze" (and so, in addition to our "gold" category, this includes funds rated as superior, AA, A, silver or bronze). Table III contains further information about the sample of mutual funds offered and recommended by each platform. It shows that equity funds are the largest category both in terms of funds offered (an average of 1,015 funds per year, or 64% of the available funds) and in terms of recommendations (an average of 82 fund recommended per platform per year, or 74% of the recommendations made), followed by fixed income and asset allocation. Alternative investment mutual funds represent only a small fraction of their offering sample.
What determines recommendations and do they affect fund flows?
A.
What determines recommendations?
In this section, we explore what determines the listing of a mutual fund in a platform recommendation list. Table IV recommended funds are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level.
Overall, recommended funds exhibit significantly better past performance. We compute fund performance percentile rankings using past one-and three-year platform-specific returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks, and we also calculate the percentage of 5-starred
Morningstar funds in each group. 14 On the former measure, the average one-year (three-year) past performance ranking of recommended funds is 55.8% (63.4%), whereas the non-recommended funds average 49.0% (48.5%).
The percentage of funds rated as gold, silver, or bronze by the Morningstar Analyst rating, a forward-looking measure of quality, is also significantly larger among recommended funds. 18.0% of recommended funds have the gold rating, compared with only 1.4% of nonrecommended funds. Indeed, over 60% (14%) of recommended (non-recommended) funds are rated as gold, silver or bronze, which suggests that platforms are either heavily influenced by
Morningstar Analyst ratings when constructing their best-buy lists, or at least that they use similar information and criteria. Recommended funds also tend to be less costly to investors, they are significantly larger in terms of assets under management, possibly in part because of the recommendations, and exhibit higher standard deviations of monthly returns.
Table IV also shows that a significantly higher percentage of affiliated than non-affiliated funds is recommended in these internal lists. Recommended funds also tend to contribute significantly higher revenues to the platforms listing them, per each pound individuals invest in through the platforms, than non-recommended funds.
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These characteristics of recommended and non-recommended funds, being univariate and observation weighted, do not necessarily imply any bias in favor of affiliated funds or funds that make larger contributions to platforms. Affiliated funds and funds that make larger revenue 14 Returns used in the computation of performance ranks are adjusted to reflect all relevant charges and rebates levied by each platform in which the fund is offered. These charges and rebates are computed assuming a total combined investment in mutual funds of GBP 50,000 through the platform. The same applies to fund expenses and charges.
14 contributions to platforms may very well be better funds. After all, recommended funds in general exhibit better past performance, expected future performance, and are on average also cheaper than non-recommended funds, and the same may be true of the subgroup of affiliated and high-contributing funds that are recommended. Even if that were not true, funds in these two categories might also exhibit other characteristics that the analysts preparing recommendations list also favor, like significant size or a long track-record.
To test whether mutual funds affiliated with the platforms and those which share more revenues with the platform (as a percentage of assets accumulated through the platform) are treated preferentially relative to non-affiliated funds or funds which share less of their revenues with the platform we study alterations which platforms make to their recommendation lists.
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Platforms adjust their recommendation lists from time to time by deleting some mutual funds and adding others. We use the following logit models separately to model fund addition and deletion probabilities: 
where the function is defined as is a vector of lagged control variables including the pro-rated total cost of the fund assuming a five-year investment or holding period (fund's total expense ratio, plus one fifth of the initial fund charge, 16 List membership depends on these decisions, as well as the initial listing decisions made when a recommendation list is first launched. In our analysis we exclude initial listing decisions since we do not always observe them in our sample (some of them were made before the start of our sample period). It is important to notice, however, that as time passes the importance or influence of initial listings becomes less relevant for current list composition.
Including initial listing as additions, for the platforms we have that information, does not significantly alter the results reported below.
15 plus associated platform charges minus any fund rebates), performance percentiles computed using platform-specific fund returns in excess of Morningstar-chosen category benchmarks over the previous one and three years (platform-specific returns take into account charges and rebates applied by platforms assuming a five-year investment or holding period), the turnover of the fund, the natural logarithm of the fund's size (in millions of GB pounds), fund age, the standard deviation of the fund's return, an indicator variable for whether Morningstar has assigned a fivestar rating to the fund, indicator variables for whether Morningstar analysts have assigned a gold, or gold, silver, or bronze rating to the fund, and unreported indicator variables for calendar years and for specific fund types (e.g., equity, fixed income, asset allocation, and alternative investments).
We estimate different logit regressions for additions to the recommendation lists and deletions from these lists. We also estimate different logit regressions for the full sample (of additions or deletions) as well as for subsamples covering the periods before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. In all cases we report coefficient estimates and zscores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level. likely to be added to recommendations lists ( 155 1DD ≥ 0, using Equation (1) notation) and less, or at most as, likely to be delisted ( 155 DEF ≤ 0), with at least one of these two inequalities satisfied in a strict sense. Similarly, a sufficient condition for favoritism towards funds paying higher revenues to the platform is that, all else equal, funds contributing higher revenues be more, or at least as, likely to be added to recommendations lists ( 9: 1DD ≥ 0), and less, or at most as, likely to be delisted ( 9: 1DD ≤ 0), with at least one of these two conditions satisfied in strict sense. significantly more likely to be added to the recommendation list than non-affiliated funds. The sub-period analysis indicates that this effect is stronger in the post-RDR period. Before RDR there was a modest, but statistically insignificant, preference for own-brand funds. Since RDR, the probability of being recommended is significantly higher for funds that are affiliated with the platform. These results are mirrored in the deletion models, where the coefficient estimates on our Affiliated dummy variable becomes negative and significant at the 1% level in the post-RDR period. This suggest that, other things equal, affiliated funds are at least equally likely, and in some situations, more likely to be deleted from recommendation lists than non-affiliated funds.
To interpret the coefficient estimates we compute average marginal effects. The second part of Table V 
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The additional control variables indicate that funds that are costlier to investors (higher Total Fees and Charges Ratio) are, other things equal, less likely to be added to recommendation lists, and as likely to be deleted once there. Thus, while platforms issuing these recommendations may favor funds that make higher payments to platforms, they do not certainly favor funds that are more expensive to their customers. Additionally, funds with better prior performance or expected future performance are marginally more likely to be added to the recommendation list and/or less likely to be deleted from these lists. In our analysis we use three different measures of fund prior performance and two measures of independent analysts' sentiment about the funds future performance, all of which are correlated with each other, thus making it difficult to interpret their individual coefficients (our main interest is in controlling for these factors rather than assessing their contribution to the appearance of a fund on an individual list). Our results suggest that Morningstar five-star funds are more likely to be added to recommendation lists and are equally likely to be deleted from them once there (when simultaneously controlling for the funds past one and three year return in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks), whereas funds with recent one and three year good past performance are less likely to be deleted from these lists. At the same time, funds rated gold, silver, or bronze by Morningstar analysts, a measure of expected future performance and independent analysts' sentiment for the fund, are marginally more likely to be added to and less likely to be deleted from these lists.
Morningstar analyst ratings are produced by a team of analysts following processes (see Armstrong, Genc, and Verbeek, 2016) that are similar to those used by the analysts that prepare platforms internal lists, without being subject to the conflicts of interest that potentially affect the latter. 20 Their significance in the previous set of regressions suggests that both groups of analysts, those behind platform recommendations and Morningstar's, share some common sentiment or perceive certain intangibles about funds in a similar way. It is even possible that the two groups imitate each other or that one of them follows the other.
Morningstar analysts are likely drawn to some of the same features of mutual funds which, while unobservable to the econometrician, also attract platform analysts. However If there is nothing special about affiliated funds and funds rebating larger shares of assets under management to platforms (before RDR) we would expect these two variables to be not statistically significant in the regressions. On the other hand, if those funds have unobservable qualities that attract analysts (for reasons other than the incentives they offer platforms) we would expect these variables to be statistically significant. This is another way of controlling for the fact that affiliated mutual funds and mutual funds that contribute larger revenues to platforms may be attractive to analysts for reasons that are difficult to quantify using traditional variables. It is also potentially more flexible, given the differences in baseline addition and deletion probabilities between platforms and analyst ratings.
We report the results of this estimation in Table VI . Results in this table show that neither an affiliation between fund and the platform where it is offered, nor revenue rebate have any significant impact on Morningstar analysts' addition and deletion decisions to gold, silver, or bronze lists, during the full sample or during any of the sample periods we study. We therefore conclude that Morningstar analysts do not see anything special in these funds. We cannot do a similar estimation for gold only lists because no affiliated fund was added to Morningstar analysts' gold list during our sample period. As a result, the coefficient on affiliated cannot be determined, if anything providing further support to the idea that affiliated funds are not special.
Overall, our results for both deletion and addition decisions provide evidence that affiliated funds are treated differently than non-affiliated funds. Affiliated funds are more likely to be added to and, after RDR, are less likely to be deleted from, recommendation lists. We find similar results for funds that share more of the commission revenues with platforms before RDR implementation. Together with the results that suggest that Morningstar analysts are not swayed 20 by these funds, they provide evidence that platform recommendation lists favor affiliated mutual funds and funds with high revenue share to an extent that is difficult to justify by the qualities of those funds.
B. What effect do recommendations have on flows?
To explore how asset flows respond to recommendations we expand a typical flowperformance regression (see, for instance, Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ) to include, as regressors, variables for past recommendations and recommendation additions and deletions.
We consider two flow measures: first, the platform-specific GBP flow into and out of a mutual fund, a variable obtained from the platforms themselves; and, second, the percentage flow computed as the ratio of platform-specific GBP flows to the total net assets invested in the mutual fund (whether through the platform or not) as of the end of the previous year.
We are interested in measuring how flows respond to recommendations and recommendation changes (that is, additions to and deletions from recommendation lists), controlling for publicly available measures of past performance, as well as for other product attributes known to affect flows which could also affect recommendations. We therefore estimate the response of platform-specific flows to recommendation changes using the following regression on yearly data:
where Flow p,f,t is either the platform-specific GBP flow or the percentage flow, &,(,)/0 is a vector that captures whether fund f appears in the recommendation list of platform p at time t-1 as well as the addition and deletion of fund f to this recommendation list over the previous three years (in three different specifications), and &,(,)/0 is the same vector of lagged control variables that we used in the previous section, except that we also include a full set of fundspecific and platform-specific indicator variables, and in the GBP flows regressions we use, as regessors, the total net assets of product i on date t-1 (fund size), rather than the log assets (see Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) ). To reduce the effect of outliers on the coefficient estimates, we remove all funds with total net assets at time t-1 below GBP 10 million from the sample (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ). (4) suggest that a mutual fund appearing in the recommendation list in the previous year receives, on average, extra net inflows equal to 1% of the overall assets managed by that mutual fund (and not just those invested through the platform) in the previous year, owing to that recommendation. 21 In all cases t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level, which are White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors corrected for possible correlation across observations of a given mutual fund (White (1980) , Rogers (1993) ).
The difference between, on the one hand, columns (1) and (4) and, on the other, columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) is that the latter also include, as regressors, indicator variables for lagged additions to and deletions from the recommendation lists while (1) and (4) do not. The reason for including lagged additions to and deletions from the recommendation lists, in addition to recommendation levels, is that the effect of a recommendation could be concentrated in the first year, or first few years, following a recommendation (additions) and investors attracted by recommendations may in fact abandon them when they cease to be recommended (deletions).
The estimates in columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) indicate that while the positive effect of recommendations on flows is spread more or less evenly during the years the fund is recommended (each year adding a similar amount of money to the funds' total net assets the 21 Because we divide flows through a single platform by total assets under management all coefficients in the percentage flows column look relatively small. To put the 1% figure in perspective, consider that the average platform in our sample has a 15%-20% market share (of the direct to consumer platform market), which means that if all the platforms were to recommend a mutual fund that would result in a 5% to 7.5% asset flow (and platforms account for less than 50% of the AUMs in the UK).
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following year), deletions lead to significant outflows in the first three years following deletion (compared to a situation where the fund was never recommended); this is possibly the result of investors attracted by those recommendations moving their money elsewhere once the fund is removed from the recommendation list.
Our regressions also indicate that previous (one year) performance and Morningstar five star ratings have a significant direct impact on asset flows, in addition to their indirect impact via recommendations, a result which is in line with the previous literature on the topic (see, for instance, Ippolito (1992) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , and Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
Explanatory variables in equations (3) and (4) are as defined before, except that we only include lagged recommendation levels. Notice that including a full set of fund indicator variables renders the inclusion of the affiliated indicator variable unnecessary, since affiliation is a mostly time invariant characteristic in our sample.
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We report the results of estimating these regressions in Table VIII Our results show that, on average, recommendations have a substantial impact on net asset flows to mutual funds. However, investors heavily discount affiliated mutual fund recommendations, to the point where it almost makes no difference for flows, but they do not adjust for favoritism towards funds with high revenue share agreements with the platforms that recommend them. 23 Only a handful of funds went from being affiliated to non-affiliated, or vice versa, during our sample period. Since the within estimator is well known to be imprecise for regressors that vary little over time we opted to exclude the Affiliated dummy variable from the model. Including it, however, has no discernible impact on any of the coefficient estimates reported in Table VIII , or their standard errors.
Do recommendations add value for investors?
We measure value to investors of fund recommendations by comparing their performance, relative to the benchmarks chosen by Morningstar for those funds, with the performance of other funds in the same Morningstar category which are also available via the platforms but are not recommended.
To generate aggregate measures of performance we create equal-weighted portfolio returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks of recommended and non-recommended funds available in each month. We do this platform by platform, and then average results across platforms, with each platform receiving the same weight. As a result, funds may be weighted more heavily if they are recommended by multiple platforms, or if they appear, but are not recommended, in more platforms. Funds which are not available via any of the platforms do not enter into our calculations. This is because we evaluate recommendation lists, and lists can only recommend funds that are part of the platforms where they appear.
Separately, we match each recommended fund to all non-recommended funds which are classified in the same (level 2) Morningstar category and also available in the platform. For each recommended fund we compute the equal-weighted average return of all non-recommended funds in both the same category and platform. We then create equal-weighted portfolio returns of the recommended funds and of the matching portfolio of non-recommended funds in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks (the benchmark is the same for recommended funds and the matching portfolio).
In our calculations we use platform-specific net returns, which take into account charges and rebates applied by platforms assuming a notional investment of GBP 50,000 per account.
Fund initial charges (front end loads), if any, are prorated assuming a five-year holding period.
The results in Table IX indicate that, over our 10-year sample period, the portfolio of all funds on the platforms' internally produced recommendation lists delivered average net returns in excess of Morningstar benchmarks of 0.08% per year. These returns are, on average, a statistically significant 0.94% per annum higher than the excess returns obtained by other funds available to investors in these platforms but not listed in recommendation lists. This comparison does not control for the types of funds that are recommended by platforms, and so may reflect, to some extent, the performance of the chosen asset class in a platform relative to benchmarks, rather than the performance of the recommended manager relative to their peers. To address this, we compare the returns of recommended funds to a matched sample of non-recommended funds 25 classified in the same Morningstar category (thus effectively comparing recommended and not recommended funds category by category in each platform) obtaining relatively similar results.
Recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds by a statistically significant 0.60% per year.
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As a robustness check, and following Gerakos, Linnainmaa, and Morse (2016) , in the last two columns of Table IX we repeat these calculations but dropping asset allocation and alternative investments funds because these funds represent heterogeneous investment strategies that make benchmarking challenging. The results for equity and fixed income funds only are similar to those reported before. Recommended funds outperform non-recommended funds in these two categories by 0.52% to 0.68% per year, depending on the benchmarking assumptions (Morningstar benchmarks or funds in the same categories available in the platform, respectively).
The results discussed above, and shown in the first part of Table IX , are obtained assuming that funds are held only for the period during which they are listed in these recommendations lists. However, investors may be inattentive or disinclined to rebalance their portfolios with the frequency that such a strategy assumes. Accordingly, the second part of Table   IX shows results for portfolios of funds built on the assumption that investors hold them for five years starting each listing month (or until the end of our sample period). 25 Under the assumption of a five-year holding period, recommended funds still outperform non-recommended ones by between 0.43% to 0.83% per year, depending on the choice of benchmark (Morningstar chosen benchmark or average performance of non-recommended funds in the same Morningstar category), and regardless of whether asset allocation and alternative investment funds are included in the calculations or not.
Analysis in Section 3A provides evidence that platform recommendation lists favor affiliated funds and funds with high revenue share to an extent that is difficult to justify by the qualities of those funds. In Table X we investigate the relationship between these two variables 24 In the comparison between recommended funds and not recommended funds in the same platform and Morningstar category we drop funds for which there is no match in the corresponding category across these two dimensions. 25 Estimates of average holding periods for mutual fund retail investors in the U.K. vary between 4 and 6 years for the period under study. See Investment Association (2016).
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on the one hand and the performance of recommended funds on the other. In this table, sample periods are tailored to the portfolios studied. In particular, they exclude periods where no affiliated funds were recommended, when studying affiliation, and the post-RDR period (when platforms were no longer allowed to retain payments from asset managers), when studying revenue share. These sample period restrictions affect the length of our time series of recommendations for the analysis in which the holding period of a fund is for as long as it is listed, but not for the analysis based on five-year holding period portfolios.
The first part of Table X When we consider portfolios of funds built assuming investors hold them for five years starting each listing month, we continue to find that recommended non-affiliated funds significantly outperform non-recommended funds by between 0.49% and 0.82% per year, depending on the choice of benchmark (Morningstar chosen benchmark or average performance of non-recommended funds in the same Morningstar category). However, recommended affiliated funds perform in line with non-recommended ones (differences in performance vary between -0.13% per year to 0.27% per year, and are in all cases not statistically significant).
It is worth noting that when we compare affiliated funds to non-affiliated funds more generally, that is, by platform and category but regardless of whether they are recommended or 26 For the five-year holding period portfolios, even though we still restrict recommendations to come from periods where affiliated funds have been recommended or the pre-RDR period, the fact that we track these recommendations during five years guarantees that the time series of portfolio returns extends for the full 10-year sample period.
27 not, we do not find differences in performance between these two groups. The average excess return over Morningstar chosen benchmarks, at -0.38% per year for affiliated funds and -0.35%
per year for non-affiliated funds, is virtually undistinguishable.
The second part of Table X shows the performance of recommended funds in the top and bottom half of revenue generated for the platform which makes the recommendation. The results in this table point to low revenue-generating recommended funds significantly outperforming non-recommended funds, but also to high revenue-generating recommended funds outperforming non-recommended funds (at least when five-year holding periods are considered). In untabulated results we also find no evidence of a (linear) relation between revenue generated for the platform and recommendation performance. In a regression of excess return over benchmarks on recommendations and the interaction between recommendations and revenue generated for the platform, using standard errors robust to general forms of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross correlation, the coefficient associated to this interaction is statistically undistinguishable from zero.
Overall, our results provide strong evidence that, on average, funds recommended by platforms outperform non-recommended funds. This is, however, not true when we confine the recommended funds to those which are affiliated with the platform, as these seem to do no better than other available funds in their same category. At the same time, the distortions brought about by the revenue sharing incentive seem to have little effect on investors who follow them. These results also help dispel the notion that private information, rather than favoritism, is behind some platforms' recommendations of their own funds. If they recommended affiliated funds because they knew something meaningful about those funds which others did not, we should expect it to be reflected in post-recommendation performance.
Conclusions
Investment platforms are important channels between mutual funds and their investors. We study investment platforms in the U.K., which has one of the largest mutual fund industries in the world and where platforms intermediate over half of mutual fund flows. Among the wide range of funds that platforms make available, they select some to recommend to investors, and these recommendations have a considerable impact on fund flows. In making these recommendations, platforms are subject to two potential conflicts of interest. First, platforms are affiliated with some of the funds they offer to investors, and second, platforms in the U.K. have been allowed, until recently, to receive from mutual funds a share of the asset management fees which the funds obtain from investors. Using a unique data set sourced through the U.K. financial regulator, which includes precise details of investment platforms' recommendations, fund flows through individual platforms, and the affiliation or revenue-sharing relationship that the platforms have with mutual funds, we examine the drivers, impact, and performance of investment platforms' recommendations of mutual funds.
We find that, on average, recommended funds exhibit significantly better past performance than the non-recommended funds which are available on the same platform, and that recommended funds are less costly to investors in fee terms. Our results also show that a significantly higher percentage of affiliated than non-affiliated funds is recommended, and that, per GBP invested, recommended funds share more of their revenues with the platforms than nonrecommended funds. Our results confirm that platform recommendations have a substantial impact on flows. However, when we confine ourselves to recommended funds which are affiliated with the platform, flows are less responsive, suggesting that investors may discount such own-brand best buys. On the other hand, flows to recommended funds do not seem to depend on the percentage of revenue shared by these funds with the platforms, suggesting that investors (who in the U.K. do not see the revenue-sharing arrangements) do not offset platforms' favoritism towards such funds. Recommended funds perform significantly better (after recommendation) than non-recommended funds. These performance results do not hold when we confine the recommended funds to those which are affiliated with the platform, as these seem to do no better than other available funds in the same category. On the other hand, the level of revenue sharing does not seem to have much impact on investors who follow them. Whether recommended funds have high or low revenue-sharing, they significantly outperform nonrecommended funds (at least when measured using five-year holding periods).
By disentangling intermediary actions from customer actions, we are able to explore whether investors see through and undo the biases of platform recommendations. We find that, with affiliated funds where the platforms' potential conflict is visible, investors partly undo the bias, but with high revenue funds where the potential conflict is not disclosed, this is not the case.
In the setting we explore, in which recommendations are offered in a standardized form to a large audience, our findings are consistent with the potentially beneficial effects of greater disclosure of otherwise hidden incentives. This table presents descriptive statistics on the sample of mutual funds and recommendation lists produced by and available through the platforms used in our study. It shows the number of GBP denominated equity, fixed income, asset allocation, and alternative investments retail mutual funds available in the UK, the average number and the percentage of available funds offered per platform, the assets under management of funds offered in the platforms as a percentage of the total assets under management of the funds available in the UK, and the average number and percentage of funds recommended in any of the recommendation lists which platforms make available to their clients. These statistics are presented for the full sample period as well as for each year during that period, and for the periods before and after RDR implementation. 
Characteristics of Mutual Funds Offered and Not Offered through the Platforms
This table presents descriptive statistics for funds offered, and not offered, through the platforms of our sample. The variables include: fund age, fund size (in billions of GBP) as measured by total assets under management, the volatility of monthly fund returns, turnover, the total fees and hypothetical platform charges for the fund, the percentage of five star rated funds by Morningstar, the percentage of gold-rated and gold, silver, or bronze-rated funds by Morningstar and mean performance percentiles. Performance percentiles are calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category and assuming average platform charges after RDR. The averages are reported for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. P-values for the differences are reported in square brackets and are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. Significance levels for tests of the difference in means are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table IV
Characteristics of Recommended and Non-Recommended Mutual Funds
This table presents descriptive statistics for funds recommended and not recommended in the recommendation lists produced by and available through the platforms of our sample. Affiliated is the percentage of funds affiliated with the platform in each category. Platform Revenue from the fund is the revenue obtained by the platform from each pound individuals invest in the fund through the platform (in %). The remaining variables are mutual fund-level variables: fund age, fund size (in billions of GBP) as measured by total assets under management, the volatility of monthly fund returns, turnover, the total net fees and platform charges for the fund, the percentage of five star rated funds by Morningstar, the percentage of gold-rated and gold, silver, or bronze-rated funds by Morningstar and mean performance percentiles. Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks over the previous one and three years. The averages are reported for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. P-values for the differences are reported in square brackets and are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. Significance levels for tests of the difference in means are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. , where ACT p,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if mutual fund f is added to or deleted from (depending on the specification) the recommendation list in platform p during month t and 0 otherwise, AFF p,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the fund f is affiliated with platform p at the end of month t−1, and RS p,f,t−1 is the revenue obtained by the platform p from each pound individuals invest in fund f through the platform at time t−1. The other lagged control variables in vector Z include the fund age, the natural logarithm of the fund's size, the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total net fees and platform charges ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, Morningstar Analysts' gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts' gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years and fund styles (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks over the previous one and three years. Different regressions are estimated for Additions and Deletions and for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. zscores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parenthesis. The second part of the table displays model-implied average marginal effects for the two variables of interest: Affiliation and Platform Revenue from the Fund. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The first part of this table reports coefficient estimates for the logit model Prob(ACT p,f,t = 1) = (AFF p,f,t−1 β AF + RS p,f,t−1 β RS + Z p,f,t−1 β Z ), where ACT p,f,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if mutual fund f offered in platform p is, respectively, added to or deleted from Morningstar's gold, silver, or bronze lists during month t and 0 otherwise, AFF p,f,t−1 is an indicator for whether the fund f is affiliated with platform p at the end of month t−1, and RS p,f,t−1 is the revenue obtained by the platform p from each pound individuals invest in fund f through the platform at time t−1. The other lagged control variables in vector Z include the fund age, the natural logarithm of the fund's size, the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total net fees and platform charges ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years, and fund styles (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated using funds returns in excess of Morningstar chosen benchmarks over the previous one and three years. Different regressions are estimated for Additions and Deletions and for the full sample as well as for the period before and after the implementation of RDR by each platform. z-scores based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regressions of Asset Flows on Past Mutual Fund Recommendations
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of yearly platform specific GBP and percentage asset flows on past fund recommendations and recommendation changes (additions and deletions from recommendation lists). BGP flows are expressed in millions of GB pounds. Percentage flows are computed as the ratio of platform specific pound flows to total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include a set of lagged control variables: the fund age, the fund size (the natural logarithm of the fund's size in the relative flow regressions), the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total expense ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, Morningstar Analysts' gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts' gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years, platforms, and individual funds (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) GBP flows are expressed in millions of GB pounds. Percentage flows are computed as the ratio of platform specific pound flows to total assets under management at the end of the previous year. Each column represents a separate regression. Affiliated is an indicator variable that has the value of one if the fund is affiliated with the platform and zero otherwise. Platform Revenue from the fund is the revenue obtained by the platform from each pound individuals invest in the fund through the platform (in %). All regressions include a set of lagged control variables: the fund age, the fund size (the natural logarithm of the fund's size in the relative flow regressions), the volatility of monthly fund returns, fund turnover, the total expense ratio for the fund, indicator variables for Morningstar five star-rated funds, Morningstar Analysts' gold-rated funds, and Morningstar Analysts' gold-, silver-, or bronze-rated funds, performance percentiles and indicator variables for calendar years, platforms, and individual funds (not reported). Performance percentiles are calculated over the previous one and three years based on funds in the same Morningstar category. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the mutual fund level are included in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by *, **, and ***, which correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) This table shows the performance of mutual funds that are listed as recommended in the internally produced lists available on the platforms in our study. The table also shows the performance of mutual funds not recommended in these lists that are also available on these platforms, and the difference in performance between recommended and non-recommended mutual funds. Performance is measured using returns in excess of benchmarks selected by Morningstar. The first column shows results for the full sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds. The second column shows results for a matched sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds classified in the same (level 2) Morningstar category, thus effectively comparing recommended and nonrecommended funds category by category. The last two columns repeat these calculations for equity and fixed income mutual funds only. The first part of the table shows the results assuming mutual funds are held only for the period they are listed (or not) in these recommendation lists whereas the second part of the table shows the same statistics for portfolios of mutual funds built assuming investors hold them for five years starting each listing month (or until the end of our sample period). Excess returns are expressed in % per year. Statistics are computed on monthly returns and annualized by multiplying monthly returns by twelve. The sample period is January 2006 to December 2015. t-statistics based on standard errors, robust to conditional heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of up to two lags as in Newey and West (1987) , are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table shows the performance of recommended mutual funds that are affiliated with the platforms where recommendations are listed, and the performance of recommended funds not affiliated with the platforms. Separately it shows the performance of recommended mutual funds in the top and bottom half of revenue generated for the platform where the recommendation are listed. Performance is measured using returns in excess of benchmarks selected by Morningstar. The first column shows results for the full sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds assuming mutual funds are held only for the period they are listed (or not). The second column shows results for a matched sample of recommended and non-recommended mutual funds classified in the same (level 2) Morningstar category, thus effectively comparing recommended and non-recommended funds category by category in each platform. The third and fourth columns show the same statistics for portfolios of mutual funds built assuming investors hold recommended and non-recommended funds for five years starting at each listing month (or until the end of our sample period). Excess returns are expressed in % per year. Statistics are computed on monthly returns and annualized by multiplying monthly returns by twelve. The sample period is tailored to the issue under study (excludes the post-RDR period for the revenue shared portfolios and periods with no affiliated funds in recommendation lists for the affiliation based portfolios). t-statistics based on standard errors, robust to conditional heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of up to two lags as in Newey and West (1987) , are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
